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Abstract
Existing mobile devices roaming around the mobility field should be
considered as useful resources in geo-temporal request satisfaction. We
refer to the capability of an application to access a physical device at
particular geographical locations and times as GeoPresence, and we pre-
sume that mobile agents participating in GeoPresence-capable applica-
tions should be rational, competitive, and willing to deviate from their
routes if given the right incentive. In this paper, we define the Hitch-
hiking problem, which is that of finding the optimal assignment of re-
quests with specific spatio-temporal characteristics to competitive mobile
agents subject to spatio-temporal constraints. We design a mechanism
that takes into consideration the rationality of the agents for request sat-
isfaction, with an objective to maximize the total profit of the system.
We analytically prove the mechanism to be convergent with a profit com-
parable to that of a 1/2-approximation greedy algorithm, and evaluate its
consideration of rationality experimentally.
1 Introduction
Current advances in mobile technology have enabled users to walk around with
portable, efficient, and powerful processing devices. Such mobile devices are no
longer being used for mere communication, but are also being used as mobile
sensors, and actuators [12]. We envision an environment, in which applications
are allowed to access these sensory powers of the existing devices in the mobility
field. In such an environment, participating self-motivated mobile agents already
roaming in a mobility field are paid to satisfy requests created by clients with
specific spatio-temporal constraints.
We refer to the capability of an application to access a physical device at
particular geographical locations, and times as GeoPresence. We categorize
GeoPresence-capable systems as either infrastructure-based, or crowdsourcing-
based. In infrastructure-based systems, the mobile agents in the field are owned
and controlled by the system administrator. Alternatively, in crowdsourcing-
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based systems, agents are autonomous, self-motivated, and rational, in a sense
that they control their own mobility schedules.
In our work, we consider the second class of GeoPresence-capable systems,
in which the system cannot control the mobile agents, or force them to follow
predefined mobility schedules. We presume that the mobile agents are rational,
self-motivated, and that they would be willing to deviate from their personal
mobility schedules if given a suitable incentive. Our contribution is to coordi-
nate, not control, the agents mobility schedules. In other words, we suggest
to the agents routes that would satisfy spatio-temporal requests provided by
clients, while ensuring that their personal schedule constraints are not altered.
In this paper, we continue on our work in [3], in which we defined the Geo-
temporal Request Satisfaction (GRS) problem as that of finding the optimal
assignment of requests with specific spatio-temporal characteristics to competi-
tive mobile agents subject to spatio-temporal constraints. Requests in the GRS
problem can be requests to visit a location (example applications are surveil-
lance, advertising, and sensor-based tasks), or to traverse a path (example ap-
plications are fleet control, car-pool management, and continuous surveillance).
In this paper, we focus on an instance of the GRS problem, namely the Hitch-
hiking problem, in which requests are for path traversals, and agents can only
satisfy one request at a time.
Paper Outline. In this paper, we define the Hitchhiking problem, and
design a mechanism that takes into consideration the rationality of the agents
for request satisfaction in Section 2. The objective of our proposed mechanism
is to maximize the total profit of the system subject to our rationality assump-
tions, i.e., maximize the social welfare of the agents. We analytically prove the
mechanism to be convergent, and to provide profit no worse that its correspond-
ing 1/2-approximation greedy algorithm. Finally, we evaluate the mechanism
experimentally in Section 3.
2 Rational Mechanisms for the
Hitchhiking Problem
The GRS problem [3] represents a huge space of spatio-temporal request alloca-
tion problems, each of which has interesting applications in mobile computing.
For the purposes of this paper, we focus on an instance of the GRS problem,
namely the Hitchhiking problem, in which requests have to be satisfied individ-
ually. Such a problem is applicable to car-pooling, path-based sensor measure-
ments, smart surveillance, and various other path-oriented applications.
2.1 The Hitchhiking Problem
We model the structure of the mobility field (e.g., map of city or locale) as a
graph G = (V,E) in which the set of vertices V represents the various landmarks
in the field (e.g., intersections), and the set of edges E represents the links
between these landmarks (e.g., streets). Movement between landmarks, i.e along
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an edge, is done in a single discrete time step. We denote by R the set of requests
submitted to the system, and by A the set of agents participating in the system.
A request in R is defined by the 3-tuple (v¯, t¯, val()), where v[i] ∈ V is the
ith desired location of the request, t[i] ≥ 0 is the corresponding time for visiting
that location, and val(v¯′, t¯′) is its valuation function. The valuation of a request
is maximized at the desired locations v¯ and corresponding times t¯, and may be
valued differently otherwise.1
An agent in A is defined by the 3-tuple (v¯, t¯, c(pj)), representing the journey
of the agent and its cost function. The agent’s desired journey is defined by its
list of locations vi ∈ V that have to be visited, and their corresponding latest
times of arrival ti ≥ 0. The agent’s cost function c(pj) defines the cost incurred
by it when choosing a path pj to make its desired journey
2. For the purposes of
this paper, we will consider agents with a single-path journey, i.e. v¯ = [vo, vf ],
and t¯ = [to, tf ].
Definition 1. (The Hitchhiking Problem) Given the mobility field graph G, a
list of requests R, and a list of agents A, the Hitchhiking problem is that of
finding a legitimate path for each agent in the list A that maximizes the total
profit of the system, which is defined as the difference between the total valuation
obtained from the serviced requests as defined by their valuation functions, and
the total cost incurred by the agents servicing these requests as defined by their
cost functions. Moreover, a legitimate path of the agent has to satisfy its journey
constraints, i.e., start at its desired start location and time, and end at its defined
destination at a time t ≤ tf .
2.2 The Hitchhiking Game
Assuming that agents should be assumed self-interested, and in competition to
maximize their self-profit, any practical mechanism used to solve it must also
satisfy such rationality constraints. In this section, we define the Hitchhiking
game with an objective to maximize the social welfare of the agents, with a
total system profit that is comparable to that of the greedy approximation.
In order to maximize system profit, and eliminate unexpected player behav-
ior, the better response dynamics defined in the games below are simulated by
a central authority. The central authority takes as input all information about
the set of participating agents, and the set of requests to be satisfied, and sim-
ulates the mechanism dynamics, i.e. the central authority plays the game on
behalf of the agents. Requests are chosen for the agents, and then the agents are
notified with their recommended paths along with their corresponding expected
payments
1The valuation function can be defined as a linear, non-negative, decreasing function (as
implemented later in this paper), as an exponential decaying function, or as a step-function.
2The cost of a path pj can be defined as the extra number of hops in that path when
compared to the shortest path that can be used for the journey (as implemented later in this
paper), or it can be defined as the difference between the agent’s latest time of arrival and
the actual time of arrival.
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In the Hitchhiking game, a player’s better response move is a proposal to
satisfy a subset of the requests that maximizes its utility, given that a player
has knowledge about the current state of the system (e.g., the requests available
and other players moves). Each player’s move generates a legitimate path for
that player. Moreover, players moves are assumed atomic and serial.
Definition 2. (The Hitchhiking Game) In the Hitchhiking game, players take
turns in making better response moves that maximize their utility until all play-
ers are satisfied with their path choices. The utility of a player in the Hitchhiking





(valrj − c(pj)) (1)
where rj is a request chosen to be satisfied by the player xi with a valuation
of val, and the cost incurred by the player to satisfy it is c(pj), in which pj is
the legitimate path traversed to satisfy that request.
Definition 3. (Domination Rule) Since players may choose to satisfy the same
request, an arbitration rule that decides which player is allowed to claim the
request is adopted. Namely, the Domination Rule states that a player xi is
allowed to dominate another player xj and claim a request rk serviced originally
by xj, only if the total profit obtained from rk when serviced by player xi, as
defined in Eq. 1, is strictly higher than that when serviced by player xj. In the
case of ties, requests are claimed in a first-come, first-serve method.
Although the Hitchhiking game interprets the rational behavior of the com-
peting agents, it may never reach Nash Equilibrium under better response dy-
namics. This non-convergence of the game is caused by the application of the
necessary domination rule, with the attempt of the players to consider multiple
requests when making their better response decisions.
Theorem 1. The Hitchhiking game may never reach Nash Equilibrium under
better response dynamics.
Proof. Consider the graph shown in the Fig. 1, in which the set A has two
players,
A = {([s1, d1], [1, 6], c(∗) = 0),
([s2, d2], [1, 10], c(∗) = 0)}
and the set R has two requests,
R = {([r11, r12], [2, 3], val1([v1, v2], [t1, t2])),
([r21, r22], [2, 3], val2([v1, v2], [t1, t2]))}
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Figure 1: Counter example that proves the non-convergence of the Hitchhiking
game.
where,
val1([v1, v2], [t1, t2]) =

7− (t1 − 2),
if v1 = r11, and v2 = r12
0, otherwise.
val2([v1, v2], [t1, t2]) =

3,
if v1 = r21, v2 = r22, and t1 = 2
0, otherwise.
Assume the initial state of the game as shown in Fig.1, in which x2 claims
request r1 for a utility of 7, and x1 has no choice but its shortest path with a
utility of 0. For the first move, x2 decides to change its path, and claims both
requests r2 and r1, in that order, with a utility of 8. Thus, giving x1 the chance
to dominate it, and claim r1 with a utility of 6. Now that x2 has lost r1 and has
a utility of only 3, it makes a move, changes its path again, and decides to claim
r1 only for a utility of 7. Again, x1 has no choice but its shortest path with a
utility of 0. This sequence of moves is repeated over and over again, leading to
the non-convergence of this instance of the game, proving that the Hitchhiking
game may not always converge under better response dynamics.
2.3 Single-stage Hitchhiking Game
Since the domination rule is necessary for profit maximization, the player’s
utility function is redefined to depend on the highest valuation of a single request
that can be part of its legitimate path.
5
Definition 4. (The HG1) The Single-Stage Hitchhiking Game takes as input
the set of available requests, and the set of agents journeys and cost functions.
Players take turns in making better response moves that maximize their utility
until all players are satisfied with their request choices, and the domination rule
is applied. The utility of a player in HG1 is defined as,
U(xi) = MAXrj∈R{valrj − c(pj)} (2)
where rj is a request chosen to be satisfied by the player xi with valuation
val, and the cost incurred by the player to satisfy it is c(pj), in which pj is the
legitimate path created to satisfy that request.
We prove below that HG1 is an exact potential game [16], which always
converges. After convergence, each player decides on the path with the highest
paying request, and marks the request’s exact location and time as part of
its journey. In other words, the player’s original journey is divided into two
smaller journeys; the first new journey starts at the same location and time as
the original journey, and ends at the marked location and time of the highest
paying request, and the second journey starts from the marked location and
time and ends at the original journey’s destination location and time.
Theorem 2. HG1 reaches Nash Equilibrium under better response dynamics.
Proof. We prove this theorem by proving that HG1 is an exact potential game




(valrj − cxi(pj)) (3)
where valrj is the valuation of the request rj , and cxi(pj) is the cost incurred
by the player xi when choosing the legitimate path pj to satisfy that request.
In other words, the function Φ(si, s−i) measures the total profit of the system
after a player xi makes a move to the state of si. According to the definitions of
the potential function of the system and the utility function of the players, we
guarantee that the potential function Φ(si, s−i) is always increasing. Moreover,
since the maximum valuations that can be obtained from all requests available in
the game are predefined, there exists a maximum profit value that the function
Φ cannot exceed. Therefore, HG1 is guaranteed to reach Nash Equilibrium
under better response dynamics.
Efficiency of HG1. As the problem representing HG1 can be formulated
as that of the Separable Assignment problem, which is known to be an instance
of maximizing a monotone submodular function over a partition matroid [9].
Following the same proof methodology, it can be shown that a greedy algorithm
solving a single-stage hitchhiking game is also a 1/2-approximation algorithm.
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2.4 Multi-stage Hitchhiking Game
According to the definition of HG1, at most a single request can be serviced
by each player. As a result, there may be requests that are left unserviced.
To service these leftover requests, the agents repeat the game in an iterative
approach.
Definition 5. (The HG∗) The Multi-Stage Hitchhiking Game is a recursive
implementation of HG1 defined above. In the first stage, the input of the game is
the set of all available requests, and the set of agents journeys and cost functions.
Then, for each stage k, the input of HGk is the set of leftover requests, and the
set of new journeys and cost functions obtained from the output of the previous
HGk−1. The multi-stage game stops when the output of HGk+1 is the same as
that of HGk, i.e., no more requests can be satisfied.
Lemma 1. The number of stages in HG∗ is polynomial.
Proof. In each stage of HG∗, at most a single request can be serviced by each
player. Therefore, the worst case scenario is when only one request is satisfied
at each stage of the game, resulting in a total number of |R| stages.
Theorem 3. The Multi-stage Hitchhiking game reaches equilibrium under better
response dynamics.
Proof. By combining our conclusions from Theorem 2 and Lemma 1; HG∗ has a
polynomial number of stages, and the HG1 played in each stage always converges
to a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, any instance of HG∗ is proven to always
converge under better response dynamics.
Efficiency of HG*. The HG* game is designed to provide suitable incen-
tives, and to encourage agent participation. However, the total profit gained by
the systems, which is represented by the central authority simulating the game,
should also be considered.
Theorem 4. The total profit obtained from the Multi-stage Hitchhiking game
is never worse than that of a multi-stage greedy algorithm.
Proof. In each single stage in the Multi-stage Hitchhiking game, the total profit
is never worse that of a greedy algorithm solving the corresponding instance of
the problem. For a satisfied request rj in a single stage, the profit obtained by
HG∗ for that request (zm(j)) is at least as much as the profit obtained by the
greedy algorithm for the same request (zg(j)). Thus, the total profit obtained
by HG∗ is never worse than that of the greedy algorithm.
Assume that zg(j) > zm(j), for a request rj . In the greedy approximation,
zg(j) indicates that for an agent xi, the incremental oracle algorithm has chosen
rj as the request that provides a maximum profit for it. In other words, rj is
the request that provides a maximum utility of zg(j) to xi. Now consider the
same request in HG∗. Agents will compete to satisfy rj , and according to
the Domination rule defined in the mechanism, the agent that provides the
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maximum revenue to the system will be allowed to claim that request. Thus,
revenue value zm(j) provided by the dominating agent xk is the maximum across
all agents in the system.
According to our assumption, zg(j) > zm(j), there exists an agent xi that
provides better revenue than xk for the same request, which is not possible
due to our mechanism rules. Therefore we conclude that zg(j) ≤ zm(j) for all
requests rj .
3 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the proposed mechanism, we designed several
sets of simulated experiments to compare it to the greedy algorithm under dif-
ferent conditions, which we explain in this section.
3.1 Experimental Setting
We emulated the behavior of HG∗ under different settings. The input of each
emulation is a graph representing the mobility field, the number of requests,
the number of agents, the total simulation time, and the agent slack. Once the
emulation starts, the lists R and A are generated with the attributes specified
below.
Each agent in A is define by the tuple ([vo, vf ], [to, tf ], c(pj)). The values vo
and vf are uniform random values over the number of locations in the mobility
field, the value to is a uniformly random value over the simulation time, and
tf = to + dist(vo, vf ) + s, in which the value s is the allowed slack by the agent.
We define slack as the maximum number of time units an agent is allowed to
waste during its journey. The cost function c(pj) of all agents is defined as the
extra number of hops in the path chosen pj when compared to the shortest path
that can be used for the agent’s journey.
Each request in R represents a journey request in the form of ([vo, vf ], [to, tf ],
val()). The values vo and vf are uniform random values over the number of
locations in the mobility field, and the values to and tf are uniform random
values over the simulation time with the constraint tf ≥ to+dist(vo, vf ). In our
experiments, a request’s valuation function is either fixed, i.e., the request has
negligible valuation if satisfied at non-defined locations and times, or linearly
decreasing according to the actual locations and times of satisfaction.
With the lists R and A, the HG∗ algorithm is invoked, in which each stage
takes as input the set of pending requests and the set of available players.
Initially, the set of pending requests is all of the requests in R, and the set of
available players are all the agents in A.
In all our experiments, we focus on two performance metrics, efficiency ratio,
and agent participation. The efficiency ratio is defined as the ratio between the
total profit obtained by all agents, and the maximum (utopian) profit, in which
the profit is the total profit attained by servicing all requests independent of
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Figure 2: The marginal utility of adding agents decreases with increased number
of agents.
agents costs. The agent participation is the percentage of agents that profit
from participating in the system.
3.2 Experimental Results
We created several sets of experiments to evaluate the performance of HG∗,
and their results are shown below. For each set of experiments, we perform 25
simulations and report their average results.
Baseline Results. In the first set of experiments, we compare the perfor-
mance of HG∗ with fixed request valuation functions to the greedy Hitchhiking
algorithm defined above. This set of experiments is based on a 40 ∗ 40 cartesian
Manhattan-style grid, with 400 requests and total simulation time of 500 time
units, and an agent slack of 100 time units.
The results shown in Fig. 2 represent the efficiency ratio of both approaches,
when varying the number of agents from 1 to 800 agents. The results support
the result of Theorem 4, as the efficiency ratio of HG∗ is never worse than that of
the greedy algorithm. For both approaches, the performance improves monoton-
ically as the number of agents in the field increases. Although the performance
of the game improves as the number of agents increases, the decreasing marginal
utility of adding more agents exemplifies the highly-combinatorial nature of the
problem, in which profit doesn’t only depend on the number of agents, but also
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Figure 3: The HG∗ game is more suitable for rational agents.
their journey constraints.
The results shown in Fig. 3 represent the agent participation percentage
of both approaches, when varying the number of agents from 1 to 800 agents.
The results confirm that HG∗ is superior in terms of satisfying the rationality
constraint of the agents. Thus, HG∗ provides more incentive for the agents to
participate in the system in return for some payoff.
Impact of Agent Slack. In the second set of experiments, we evaluate the
performance of the mechanism with fixed request valuation functions. This set
of experiments is based on a 40 ∗ 40 cartesian Manhattan-style grid, with 400
requests, total simulation time of 500 time units, and the number of agents is
200.
The results shown in Fig. 4 represent the efficiency ratio, and agent partic-
ipation percentage of both approaches, when varying the slack of agents from
0 to 800 time units. The results show that although the difference between the
efficiency ratio of both approaches is nearly 5%, the agent participation per-
centage in the game is nearly 20% better than that of the greedy algorithm.
This shows that in HG∗, agents have a higher incentive to increase their slack
to gain more profit.
Impact of Flexible Valuation. In the third set of experiments, we evaluate
the performance of the mechanism with flexible valuation functions. This set
of experiments is based on a 40 ∗ 40 cartesian Manhattan-style grid, with 400
requests and total simulation time of 500 time units, and an agent slack of
100 time units. The flexibility region of each request is a 5-step neighborhood
around the original request locations, and a 10-time-unit region around the
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Figure 4: The performance of HG∗ compared to the greedy Hitchhiking algo-
rithm, with increasing agent slack.
original request times.
The results shown in Fig. 5 represent the efficiency ratio of HG∗, when using
both fixed and flexible valuation functions for the requests. The efficiency ratio
when using flexible valuation functions is atleast 10% better. Moreover, the use
of flexible valuation functions is clearly superior for less number of agents, ex.,
the efficiency ratio is 25% higher when the number of agents is only 50.
4 Related Work
Existing GeoPresence-capable systems can be categorized as either infrastruc-
ture-based, or crowdsourcing-based. In infrastructure-based systems, agents are
owned by a system provider, and their actions are controlled to optimize the
system’s objective. In such systems, agents can be stationary, as in traditional
wireless sensor networks [13], in which the spatio-temporal request satisfaction
process is commonly defined as the transformation of the requests into an ap-
propriate queries to be applied on a spatio-temporal database [10].
Alternatively, agents can be mobile, as in robotics [8, 14] and dedicated ve-
hicular systems [15, 5], with their journeys decided according to the system’s
constraints. Mobility control is widely used for field coverage [11], maintenance
of communication chains [7] or for specific task accomplishment [18]. One of
the common approaches for spatio-temporal request satisfaction in such a class
of systems is auction-based approaches as in [4, 6], in which robots bid for the
requests that maximize their utility. Although, auction-based request satisfac-
tion is similar to our approach, the request allocation mechanisms used do not
consider mobility constraints introduced by rational, individual agents that are
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Figure 5: Better profit can be achieved with flexible valuation.
willing to deviate from their original journeys.
In crowdsourcing-basedGeoPresence-capable systems, agents are self-mot-
ivated, with predefined schedules and uncontrolled mobility patterns. They
willingly participate in the system and decide whether or not to perform a
task. i.e., service a request, according to their prior plans, and they may al-
ter their schedules to perform a task if given the right incentive to do so. In
existing crowdsourcing-based systems, the request satisfaction decision is per-
formed solely by the agents, and the system cannot dictate and/or predict their
behavior. Examples of these systems include enterprise-based crowdsourcing
applications as Amazon Mechanical Turk [2] and Uber[19], and opportunistic
sensor networks as in [1, 20]. The spatio-temporal request satisfaction pro-
cess in such systems is opportunistic, ad-hoc, and provides no quality-of-service
guarantees.
Our proposed model lies under the crowdsourcing-based systems category,
with an assumption that the self-motivated agents allow for coordinated mobility
patterns. This notion of mobility coordination has first been proposed in [17],
according to our knowledge, in which the authors assume that mobile nodes
have a flexibility in their schedule, and they leverage this flexibility to obtain a
certain coverage distribution of the network.
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5 Conclusion
In our work, we propose the idea of coordinating crowdsourced mobile resources
for geo-temporal request satisfaction, which creates a new model for resource
management in the field of Internet of Things and smart objects. A coordinated
model of resource management, in which the concern of the system is not only to
optimize for some objective, but to also incentivize the agents, resource owners,
to participate in such a system. In this paper, we presented the Hitchhiking
problem as a special instance of the GRS problem, and designed a mechanism
that maximizes the system’s profit, while providing suitable incentives for the
agents to participate.
In our future work, we aim to model and develop the different components
of our proposed GeoPresence-as-a-Service (GPaaS) framework, which acts as a
proxy between clients with specific spatio-temporal requests, and agents capable
of servicing these requests, to provide market-place on-demand sensory services
using the help of these already roaming mobile agents.
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